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STATES AND SYSTEMIC RISK: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S
(UN)COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
Daniel A. Lyons
The Financial Stability Oversight Council represented an innovative approach to the problem of systemic risk in the American economy. It also represented an innovative form of cooperative federalism. By grafting state regulators
onto the Council as nonvoting members, Congress hoped this new federal superregulator would draw upon a reservoir of state expertise and local knowledge so
that the Council’s final decisions reflected a collaborative effort between the nation’s top experts at the federal and state level.
But looking back over the first decade of the Council’s operations, it is clear
that this experiment failed to work as Congress intended. Federal decisionmakers
consciously minimized the role of their state counterparts and asserted jurisdiction
over America’s largest insurance companies, stepping confidently into an industry
that was historically the prerogative of the states over the objection of the Council’s
state regulator members. Ultimately, the D.C. district court vacated the Council’s
overreach, citing the very same arguments pressed by state regulators that were
disregarded by the Council during its deliberations. By publicly dissenting from
the Council’s decisions, state regulators planted seeds of doubt that would ultimately lead the Council to abandon its efforts. The Council’s foray into insurance
regulation reflected not the collaborative consensus of cooperative federalism, but
a more discordant process in which state officials work within a federal system to
resist policies with which they disagree—a phenomenon known as “uncooperative
federalism.”
This Article critically examines the role that state regulators could, and did,
play during the Council’s first decade of deliberations and explores the ramifications of that experience for theories of cooperative and uncooperative federalism.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s experiment with integrating state regulators at the federal
decision-making level did not work as Congress hoped, but it inadvertently revealed a powerful way that states can use tools of administrative law to protect
state autonomy from agency overreach through the administrative safeguards of
federalism.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been over a decade since Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act,1 and
it is easy to forget just how truly innovative this statute was. Enacted against the
backdrop of the worst economic crisis in seventy-five years, and responding to
President Obama’s call for a “sweeping overhaul of the United States financial
regulatory system, a transformation on a scale not seen since . . . the Great Depression,”2 this landmark legislation urged a comprehensive re-thinking of the
1

Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Regulatory
Reform (June 17, 2009) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pre
2
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financial services industry.3 Consistent with the idiom that challenging situations
require creative solutions, the Act’s 849 pages4 were filled with revolutionary
new ideas and administrative structures designed to challenge the status quo—
some of which have worked out better than others.5
A key innovation was the establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council,6 a regulatory super-committee aptly described by one article as “a ‘Justice League’ of federal financial regulators . . . charged with keeping the world
safe from systemic risk.”7 Congress created the Council to address the perception
that financial regulation was carried out piecemeal by several disparate entities,
none of which was charged with monitoring the system as a whole.8 The Council
fills this hole using several policy tools designed to identify and respond to risks
to the American financial system.9 Among other charges, the Council has the
authority to regulate bank holding companies with over $50 billion in assets and
any other bank or nonbank financial company that the Council designates as systemically important.10
The Council’s unique structure also reflects an innovative form of cooperative federalism. Much of the Council’s attention focuses on the banking, securities, and insurance industries—areas traditionally regulated (at least in part) by
the states.11 In recognition of the states’ historical expertise in these areas, and
cognizant of the potential for jurisdictional conflicts, Congress endowed states
with an unusually prominent voice in the Council’s deliberations.12 Three active
ss-office/remarks-president-regulatory-reform [perma.cc/6PMS-Z7M4]).
3
See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND
ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 2 (2010).
4 See Dodd-Frank Act.
5 See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2191 (2020) (noting that the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, “deviated
from the structure of nearly every other independent administrative agency in our history” in
ways that “violates the Constitution’s separation of powers”).
6 See Dodd-Frank Act § 111-123.
7 Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-Frank Act and Housing Finance: Can It Restore Private
Risk Capital to the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155, 163 (2012).
8 See, e.g., EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42083,
FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK 1
(2011).
9 Id. at 4.
10 Id. at 24; see, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 121; Skeel, supra note 3, at 78.
11 See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Systemic Risk Oversight and the Shifting Balance of State and
Federal Authority Over Insurance, 5 UC IRVINE L. REV. 1389, 1391 (2015) (discussing traditional federal regulation of insurance); Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition,
Cooperation, and Securities Enforcement, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 111–12 (2005) (discussing
federal and state authority over securities regulation); see also infra text accompanying notes
87–106.
12 See Daniel Schwarcz & David Zaring, Regulation by Threat: Dodd-Frank and the Nonbank
Problem, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1813, 1821 (2017) (“This membership incorporates a number of
diverse viewpoints and, unlike other interagency committees, uniquely includes voices of state
regulators in its mix.”).
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state regulators (one each from the banking, securities, and insurance sectors)
participate as non-voting members of the Council.13 And the Act makes multiple
other provisions for state officials to influence Council decision-making, either
directly (such as by participating in ad hoc advisory committees)14 or indirectly
(by filling newly created federal positions where prior state regulatory experience would be beneficial, as happened when former state insurance regulators
served as the inaugural Director of the new Federal Insurance Office and as the
Council’s Independent Member with Insurance Expertise).15
This structure reflects an interesting evolution in Congress’s ongoing experiments with federalism. Traditionally, the government adhered to a “Dual Federalism” model, wherein federal and state sovereigns operated autonomously
within clearly delineated spheres of authority.16 More recently, Congress has enacted statutes “that invite state agencies to implement federal law,” a model
dubbed “cooperative federalism” by scholars.17 In most cooperative federalism
programs, federal authorities design the overarching policy, and the states’ role
is largely to help carry out those mandates.18 But the Dodd-Frank Act integrates
state regulators much earlier—at the decision-making stage—which raises questions about its compatibility with the original constitutional design.19 By grafting
state regulators into the federal process, Congress intended for this new federal
regulator to draw upon a reservoir of state-level knowledge to improve the Council’s decision-making processes and minimize friction with state regulators—so
that the Council’s final actions reflect a collaborative effort between the nation’s
top experts at both the federal and state level.20
But looking back over the first decade of the Council’s operations, this experiment in federalism often failed to work as Congress intended. The agency
immediately took steps to minimize the state regulators’ role.21 When the Council designated insurance firms like Prudential and MetLife as “too big to fail”22—
13

Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(2).
Id. § 111(d), (g).
15 See infra text accompanying notes 52–54.
16 See e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in the New World of Energy Federalism, 67
EMORY L.J. 921, 928 (2018).
17 Philip J. Weiser, Towards a New Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism,
79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001).
18 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1258 (2009).
19 See infra Section II.B.1.
20
See 156 CONG. REC. 7672 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins) (“I think those State
regulators should be brought on to the council . . . . What we want is a council with as broad
an overview as possible, bringing together everyone who has a role so we do not have these
regulatory gaps, these black holes developing in the future, and so that we can bring the collective wisdom of these officials to the table.”).
21 See infra text accompanying notes 233–51.
22 Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Basis for the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final
Determination Regarding Prudential Financial, Inc. (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Prudential
Decision], https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/documents/prudential%20
14
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stepping confidently into an industry that was historically the prerogative of the
states—its decisions proved controversial and came over the objection of the
Council’s state insurance regulators.23 Ultimately, the D.C. district court vacated
the Council’s MetLife decision, citing the very same arguments pressed earlier
by state regulators and leading the Council to abandon its insurance regulations.24
Thus, the Council’s insurance decisions reflect not the collaborative consensus of cooperative federalism, but a more discordant process in which state regulators used their position within the federal scheme to resist decisions with
which they disagreed—a phenomenon that Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather
Gerken have dubbed “uncooperative federalism.”25 While the work to date on
uncooperative federalism focuses on the states’ role in carrying out federal mandates, the Council demonstrates that states achieve many of the same advantages
when embedded in the initial process of formulating those mandates.26 Written
opinions by the state insurance regulator members (and the dissenting opinion
by Independent Member Roy Woodall, a former state insurance regulator) placed
important concerns into the Council’s official record and laid the groundwork
for eventual reversals of the Council’s insurance designation decisions.27
This Article will critically examine the role that state regulators could and
did play during the Council’s first decade of deliberations and explore the ramifications of this experience for theories of cooperative and uncooperative federalism. Part I will examine the Council’s structure and the myriad ways, both obvious and subtle, that state regulators could influence Council deliberations. Part
II will discuss why Congress included state regulators in the Dodd-Frank Act,
analyzing the benefits that legislators hoped to achieve by giving states a seat at
the federal table and the concerns about the undue influence granted to the intergovernmental lobby as a result of this structure. Part III will show how the Council’s actual experience fell short of legislators’ hopes by chronicling the Council’s efforts to identify and mitigate systemic risk in the insurance sector. Part IV
will examine this interaction between the Council’s state and federal officials
financial%20inc.pdf [perma.cc/C869-QUKA]; Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Basis of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council’s Final Determination Regarding MetLife, Inc. (Dec.
18, 2014) [hereinafter MetLife Decision], http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designatio
ns/Documents/MetLife%20Public%20Basis.pdf [perma.cc/P5TF-8WDQ].
23 Fin. Stability Oversight Council, View of Director John Huff, the State Insurance Commissioner Representative on the Council’s Final Determination Regarding Prudential Financial,
Inc. (Sept. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Huff Prudential Dissent], https://www.treasury.gov/initiative
s/fsoc/council-meetings/Documents/September%2019%202013%20Notational%20Vote.pdf
[perma.cc/R3MW-FXU9]; Fin. Stability Oversight Council, View of Adam Hamm, the State
Insurance Commissioner Representative on the Council’s Final Determination Regarding
MetLife, Inc. (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Hamm MetLife Dissent], https://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/fsoc/designations/Documents/Dissenting%20and%20Minority%20Views.pdf [per
ma.cc/6T4C-DQBY].
24 See infra Section III.C.1.
25 Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1259.
26 See infra Parts III–IV.
27 See infra Part III.
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through the lens of uncooperative federalism, showing how state regulators ultimately succeeded in preventing the Council from regulating the insurance industry despite having no vote on Council decisions. It will also show how the story
of the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s foray into insurance advances our
understanding of the “administrative safeguards of federalism.”28
I.

THE FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AND THE ROLE OF THE
STATES

A. The Council’s Mission and Composition
Congress created the Financial Stability Oversight Council to fill gaps in the
financial regulatory scheme that may have contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.29 The Dodd-Frank Act (“the Act”) tasks the Council with monitoring the
financial system as a whole, by bringing regulators together at least quarterly to
discuss the general stability of the financial system outside of the myopic confines of their daily responsibilities.30 One article has aptly described the body as
“a financial uber-regulator” tasked with identifying and mitigating systemic risk
in the American economy.31
The Act charges the Council with three primary responsibilities. First, it is
to “identify risks to the financial stability of the United States” that could arise
from large bank holding companies, nonbank financial companies, or other entities outside the financial services marketplace.32 Second, the Council should
“promote market discipline, by eliminating expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors, and counterparties . . . that the Government will shield them from
losses in the event of failure.”33 And finally, the body is tasked with a general
duty to “respond to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
system.”34
To fulfill these mandates, the Act grants the Council with a wide range of
duties and powers, which in turn can also be classified into three general categories. The first is information gathering and sharing, a category that includes collecting data from member agencies and regulated entities, facilitating information sharing and coordination among federal and state regulators, and
directing the Office of Financial Research (a new, permanent data-gathering and
analysis office housed within the Treasury Department and staffed by financial

28

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1285; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Ernest
A. Young, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE
L.J. 2111, 2145 (2008).
29 See, e.g., Murphy & Bernier, supra note 8, at 1.
30 Id. at 7.
31 Levitin et al., supra note 7, at 163.
32 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
33 Id. § 112(a)(1)(B).
34 Id. § 112(a)(1)(C).
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experts to support the Council’s deliberations).35 The second and most prominent
duty could be called supervision and regulation, which includes designating
which firms are systemically important and subjecting them to oversight by the
Federal Reserve, recommending prudential standards that the Federal Reserve
should use to evaluate banks and systemically important nonbank firms, suggesting that regulators adopt new or more stringent standards, and deciding whether
a particular nonbank firm should be liquidated by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation rather than through a bankruptcy court.36 Finally, the Council plays
a coordinating role among financial regulators, not only by providing a forum to
discuss issues but also by formally resolving jurisdictional disputes among member agencies.37
As indicated above, the Council’s ten voting members comprise a veritable
who’s who of federal financial regulation. This list includes heads of the following agencies:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Department of the Treasury
Federal Reserve Board
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Federal Housing Finance Agency
National Credit Union Administration38

The Council also includes an Independent Member with Insurance Expertise
as a voting member, who is appointed by the President to a six-year term with
the advice and consent of the Senate.39 The Secretary of the Treasury serves as
the Chairperson of the Council, a position with substantial influence over the
Council’s deliberations.40
To help inform the Council’s deliberations, the Act also provides for five
subject-matter experts to participate as nonvoting members. The first of these is
35

Id. § 112(a)(2).
Id. §§ 113, 115, 120.
37 Id. § 119.
38 Id. § 111(b)(1).
39 Id. § 111(b)(1)(J), (c)(1). This position is currently filled by Thomas Workman, an insurance lawyer and former president and CEO of Life Insurance Council of New York, Inc. He
was appointed in 2018 to succeed Roy Woodall, a former Kentucky state insurance commissioner and former chief counsel for state relations for the American Council of Life Insurers.
40 Id. § 111(b)(1)(A). As David Skeel has noted, the choice of the Treasury Secretary to chair
the Council is curious, as the Treasury Department is the only executive branch agency on the
Council; the other agencies are largely independent agencies that are somewhat insulated from
White House control. This structure raises questions about the Council’s ability to be independent of political pressure in the event of a crisis. See Skeel, supra note 3, at 12 (“Because
the Treasury secretary is directly responsible to the President, he is the least independent, and
the most political, of the financial regulators. Yet the Treasury secretary is given leadership
responsibility on the new Financial Stability Oversight Council and in other areas.”).
36
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the Director of the afore-mentioned Office of Financial Research, who (like the
Independent Member with Insurance Expertise) is appointed by the President to
a six-year term with the advice and consent of the Senate.41 This list also includes
the Director of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), a position appointed by the
Treasury Secretary.42 Rounding out the list, the Council also includes a state insurance commissioner, a state banking supervisor, and a state securities commissioner, all of whom are elected by their fellow state regulators.43
B. State Influence on Council Decision-Making
The Dodd-Frank Act creates at least three opportunities for state officials to
have a direct and systemic impact on the Council’s deliberations. The first and
most obvious is the three state regulators appointed to the Council.44 While these
members do not vote on Council matters, the Act makes clear that they “shall not
be excluded from any of the proceedings, meetings, discussions, or deliberations
of the Council.” 45 The only exception is if exclusion is “necessary to safeguard
and promote the free exchange of confidential supervisory information,” whereupon the Chairperson may exclude a nonvoting member if a majority of the member agencies concur.46
The Act also allows the Council to appoint any special advisory, technical,
or professional committee as “may be useful in carrying out the functions of the
Council.”47 Congress explicitly clarified that this authority includes the power to
appoint “an advisory committee consisting of State regulators.”48 Importantly,
the Act exempts the Council and any committees established under this section
from compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 49 a “Sunshine Act”
for advisory committees that requires, among other things, that committee meetings be open to the public, that notice of meetings be published in the Federal

41

Dodd-Frank Act § 152(b)(1).
Id. § 502. This position is currently held by Steven Seitz, who served as deputy director
under inaugural director Michael McRaith, a former Illinois state insurance commissioner.
43 Id. § 111(b)(2).
44 Id.
45 Id. § 111(b)(3).
46 Id. The Council’s bylaws also require a member to disqualify himself or herself in the event
that the member has, or appears to have, a financial conflict of interest or appearance of partiality, the latter of which is defined as participation in a proceeding that has a financial effect
on the council member’s household or that involves certain defined relationships. See Rules
of Organization of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, § XXX.9 (Oct. 1, 2010) [hereinafter Council Bylaws] http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FSOCbylaws.pdf [per
ma.cc/4BW8-PHX6].
47 Dodd-Frank Act § 111(d).
48 Id.
49 Id. § 111(g).
42
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Register, and that detailed minutes of each meeting be kept and made available
to the public.50
Finally, the two insurance positions present yet another, more subtle, way
that state regulators might influence the Council. The Act contemplates that both
the voting Independent Member and the nonvoting Federal Insurance Office Director have prior experience in the insurance industry.51 Because the bulk of insurance regulation occurs at the state level, state regulators comprise an attractive
pool from which to fill these positions. And indeed, the first official appointed to
each position was a former state insurance regulator. Independent Member Roy
Woodall was a former Kentucky state insurance commissioner who highlighted
his decade of experience in the Kentucky Insurance Department in his opening
remarks as a nominee.52 Similarly, FIO Inaugural Director Michael McRaith was
actively serving as Illinois Insurance Director when Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner appointed him to the federal position in 2011.53 Unlike the nonvoting
state regulator members, neither Woodall nor McRaith held state office concurrently with their federal duties, though both could draw upon their perspectives
as former state regulators when participating in Council deliberations. (It is also
worth noting that while, by custom, a state regulator will typically resign his or
her position upon assuming federal office, as Director McRaith did—and some
states require it—there is no federal constitutional prohibition on an official holding federal and state regulatory appointments simultaneously.)54
By integrating state regulators into the Council structure, the Dodd-Frank
Act gives states potentially significant influence over federal financial regulation
decisions.55 Commentators have criticized the Dodd-Frank Act for refusing to
make important policy judgments about how the financial industry should be
50

Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 10, 86 Stat. 770, 770 (1972) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app.). The Federal Advisory Committee Act was passed in 1972
in response to criticism that the advisory committee process was wasteful and abused by special interests seeking access to agencies or the executive; see, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t
of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 453 (1989).
51 Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(1)(J).
52 Financial Stability Oversight Council Nominations Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 321 (2011).
53 See Arthur D. Postal, McRaith to Lead FIO, THINKADVISOR (Mar. 17, 2011, 8:00 PM), http
://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/03/17/mcraith-to-lead-fio [perma.cc/M7HU-3BE6]. McRaith
stepped down at the end of the Obama administration. He was succeeded by Steve Dreyer,
who served for five months in 2018 before resigning and being replaced by Steve Seitz. Both
successors had prior experience in the insurance industry but unlike McRaith were not former
state regulators.
54 See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers
or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1994) (noting that the Constitution does not prohibit one from holding federal and state office simultaneously, and that the
founders may in fact have favored the practice, but that a strong norm against it has developed
over time).
55 Cf. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1268–69 (noting that “integration” of state
officials into federal policymaking can give states leverage to effect change by opting out of,
or otherwise resisting, enforcement).
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regulated, instead punting those difficult questions to agencies that the Act created or strengthened.56 The Financial Stability Oversight Council acts as a coordinator of these efforts, endowed with considerable authority to make recommendations to these agencies regarding how best to carry out their duties.57
Among other duties, the Council is charged to:
facilitate information sharing among . . . Federal and State agencies regarding
domestic financial services policy development, rulemaking . . . and enforcement
actions;
recommend to the member agencies general supervisory priorities and principles . . . ;
....
require supervision by the Board of Governors [of the Federal Reserve] for nonbank financial companies that may pose risks to the financial stability of the
United States . . . ;
make recommendations to the [Federal Reserve] concerning the establishment
of heightened prudential standards for . . . [oversight] for [systemically important]
nonbank financial companies and . . . bank[s] . . . ;
....
make recommendations to primary financial regulatory agencies to apply new
or heightened standards and safeguards for financial activities or practices that
could create or increase risks . . . [in the] financial markets;
review and, as appropriate, . . . submit comments to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission and any standard-setting body with respect to . . . accounting principle[s].58

Although the state regulator members lack a vote on Council actions, the Act
mandates that they are otherwise to be treated as equal participants in Council
discussions.59 Under the Council’s bylaws, the chairperson must consult regularly with all members, voting and nonvoting alike.60 And the Council must meet
at least quarterly,61 ensuring that the states, through their appointed regulators,
have regular input into some of the most significant regulatory questions in the
financial sector.
This routine representation has important implications for the division of authority between the federal government and the states. As Larry Kramer observes, “states have been able to use their position in the administrative system
to protect state institutional interests,” a process he describes as one of the modern-day political safeguards of federalism.62 Like many other agencies, the
56

See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t ‘Screw Joe the Plumber’: The Sausage-Making of
Financial Reform, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 54–59 (2013) (examining the comments received by
the Council in connection with its efforts to implement the Volcker Rule and the ways in which
policymaking devolves to the agencies under Dodd-Frank).
57 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010).
58 Id. § 112(a)(2)(E)–(L).
59 Id. § 111(b)(3).
60 See Council Bylaws, supra note 46, § XXX.3(a)(1).
61 Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Act § 111(e).
62 Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215, 283 (2000). Roderick Hills has noted that this camaraderie could go too
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Council has the potential to significantly affect state law by recommending areas
where federal agencies could preempt state authority or enlisting states to help
carry out federal mandates.63 The nonvoting member seats give state interests a
direct input into these questions, ensuring at a minimum that the Council is fully
informed of the states’ perspectives on issues with federalism implications.64
But the influence of these state members potentially stretches beyond the
Council’s official business. The Council also provides a forum through which
state regulatory officials regularly interact with the federal government’s most
important financial policymakers. State regulators who participate on the Council build a rapport with these officials, giving them the opportunity to advocate
on behalf of state interests even on matters not formally before the Council.65
One might argue this influence is tempered by the two-year term for the state
regulator nonmembers, which is considerably less than most other Council members.66 But for state regulators, informal ties developed with federal policymakers during their service on the Council may remain valuable even after they step
down. In that sense, the two-year limit may be advantageous to states, as it increases the number of state regulators who have the opportunity to develop lasting relationships with their federal counterparts.
Thus, through the Financial Stability Oversight Council, Congress gave state
regulators a significant voice in the regulatory overhaul of the financial sector
that the Dodd-Frank Act was meant to instigate. The next Part discusses Congress’s motivation for doing so: Why were state regulators added to the Council,
and what were the potential benefits and risks of this innovative form of cooperative federalism?
II. THE HOPES AND FEARS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT’S COOPERATIVE
far if state bureaucrats feel such a kinship to their federal counterparts over time that they
effectively shift allegiance from the state to the federal regime. He dubs this “picket-fence
federalism.” Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment as Curb on Bureaucratic Power,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1225, 1227 (2001). The picket fence metaphor assumes the horizontal flats
on the fence represent the various levels of government, and the vertical posts represent bureaucrats. The metaphor is meant to suggest that the federal and state “posts” often “share
more in common with each other than they do with the level of government by which they are
employed.” Id.
63 See, e.g., Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32
REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 353 (2013) (noting that the Council can veto proposed rulemakings by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which could otherwise preempt state
law).
64 See, e.g., Opinion, In Washington, Every Problem Is a Bank, WALL ST. J., (Aug. 28, 2013,
6:25 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732459120457903922155780745
0 [perma.cc/2ZN2-BSFH ] (discussing state insurance commissioner member John Huff’s advice to the Council during his term).
65 See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 18, at 1268–69 (“When an actor is embedded in
a larger system, a web of connective tissues binds higher- and lower-level decisionmakers.
Regular interactions generate trust and give lower-level decisionmakers the knowledge and
relationships they need to work the system.”).
66 Dodd-Frank Act § 111(c)(1).
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FEDERALISM
It was not obvious that Congress would explicitly make such a prominent
opportunity for state regulators on a council designed to regulate the nation as a
whole. Indeed, the Dodd-Frank Act was designed to cure perceived deficiencies
in state-level regulation in the years leading up to the Great Recession, particularly in the realms of consumer protection and insurance that were traditionally
prerogatives of the states.67 The Senate Committee Report explained that the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau was necessary because the pre-DoddFrank “system of consumer protection suffer[ed] from a number of serious structural flaws that undermine[d] its effectiveness.”68 And the Federal Insurance Office was created because the 2008 bailout of prominent insurer American International Group (AIG) suggested that state insurance regulators lacked the
perspective to manage systemic risk.69
At the same time, Congress recognized that state regulators could be instrumental in helping solve the problems that Dodd-Frank sought to fix. For example, the same Senate Report recognized that many states did attempt to tighten
up consumer lending through more aggressive anti-predatory lending laws, only
to find those efforts stymied by federal preemption.70 And other than AIG, most
insurance companies weathered the 2008 financial crisis without the significant
turmoil that befell subprime lending, investment banks, depository institutions,
and other distressed segments of the financial sector.71 As Patricia McCoy explains, “With one exception, insurance seemed to remain the sleepy and unglamorous outpost of financial services it had always been in recent years.”72
A. Benefits of Dodd-Frank’s Cooperative Federalism
With respect to the Financial Stability Oversight Council in particular, the
inclusion of the state regulators as nonvoting members represented a conferencecommittee compromise between the House and Senate versions of the bill.73 The
original House bill included state insurance and banking regulators as nonvoting
members.74 It was later amended to add a state securities commissioner and the
Director of the Federal Insurance Office, and additional language was added to
clarify that they “shall not be excluded from any of the Council’s proceedings,
67

McCoy, supra note 11, at 1394.
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 10 (2010).
69 McCoy, supra note 11, at 1401.
70 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16; see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion
of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893 (2011).
71 McCoy, supra note 11, at 1401.
72 Id.
73 See Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism Under Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 586–87
(2011).
74 H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 1001(b)(1) (as introduced, Dec. 2, 2009), https://www.congress.
gov/111/bills/hr4173/BILLS-111hr4173ih.pdf [perma.cc/FF6C-659X].
68
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meetings, discussions, and deliberations.”75 But the Senate version of the bill
lacked these provisions76 despite lobbying from state interest groups.77 The Conference Committee used the Senate’s bill as the base text, but later added back
the nonvoting members in the final language.78
While the legislative history on this issue is sparse, the few breadcrumbs
suggest that Senator Susan Collins may have helped keep the state members on
the Council. Collins herself served for five years as Commissioner of Maine’s
Department of Professional and Financial Regulation before being elected to federal office, and touted this prior experience while playing an active role in the
bill’s final passage.79 During Senate deliberations, she and Senator Patty Murray
co-sponsored an amendment that would have added the state members to the
Senate version of the bill, but the amendment was tabled without a vote.80 This
amendment, and her statement in support,81 suggests that she was vested in the
idea of maintaining a state voice on the Council. She was also one of few Republicans willing to cross the aisle to support the Act, which gave her significant
influence over the final draft.82 Fortune Magazine reported at the time that
“[a]lthough she is not one of the conference committee members negotiating the
final package, Collins is masterfully playing herself as the key vote to get reform
done.”83 Given her background and her statements before the Senate, it is possible her support helped get the nonvoting members language into the final compromise bill.

75

H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2) (2009), https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/hr4173/BI
LLS-111hr4173eh.pdf [perma.cc/KXW7-9W27].
76 S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2) (2010); H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 111(b)(2) (as amended
by the Senate, May 20, 2010), https://www.congress.gov/111/bills/hr4173/BILLS-111hr4173
eas.pdf [perma.cc/SDF4-Q47F]. The Senate bill did provide for the Director of the Office of
Financial Research to participate ex officio.
77 The National Association of Insurance Commissioners lobbied the Senate to include an
active state insurance regulator as a voting member on the Council, but it was unsuccessful.
See, Letter from Jane L. Cline et al., Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs Bd., to Senators regarding
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010 (April 20, 2010) (available at https://ww
w.naic.org/documents/testimony_100420_rafsa.pdf [perma.cc/TP4A-R24U]).
78 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). As Gillian Metzger notes, the Senate bill also included a more powerful Office of National Insurance, which
suggests a desire for the Council to play a more active role in insurance regulation. Metzger,
supra note 73, at 586 n.94. This was replaced in conference with the weaker Federal Insurance
Office.
79 See Anna Palmer, How Susan Collins Became the Key to Financial Reform, FORTUNE (June
25, 2010, 9:18 AM), https://archive.fortune.com/2010/06/25/news/susan_collins_financial_re
form.fortune/index.htm [perma.cc/5EVP-ALBW].
80 See S.A. 3754, 111th Cong., 156 CONG. REC. 6938–39 (2010).
81 156 CONG. REC. 8193 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
82 Ultimately Collins and fellow New England Republicans Olympia Snowe and Scott Brown
were the only three Republicans to support the bill in the Senate.
83 See Palmer, supra note 79.
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When discussing her amendment, Collins cited two rationales supporting the
integration of state regulators into the Council,84 both of which would sound familiar to federalism scholars: expertise and local knowledge.85
1. Expertise
As the Council was charged with conducting detailed analyses of financial
risks in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, Congress wanted to make
sure it could draw upon the expertise of state regulators with accumulated experience overseeing these sectors.86 Senator Collins noted that state regulators
“play such a critical role” in regulating these fields and that the bill should “bring
the collective wisdom of these officials to the table” when deliberating.87
Of course, the expertise that state regulators could bring vis-à-vis their federal counterparts varied. For instance, in banking, the industry over which the
Council has the most oversight, federal and state regulators have shared regulatory authority since at least 1933.88 State-chartered banks are subject to significant state banking regulations and oversight by the Federal Reserve Board, while
federally chartered banks are regulated and overseen by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.89 This shared regulatory authority has not always translated to peaceful coexistence: as hinted above, state and federal banking regulators famously clashed over the enforcement of state predatory lending
prohibitions in the years leading up to the financial crisis, leading to mixed results in the Supreme Court.90 The Dodd-Frank Act sided with the states in these
disputes and restricted the Comptroller’s ability to preempt state law.91 The Senate Report on the Act strongly suggests that Congress felt that state regulators
deserved a stronger voice than they had before the Act was passed.92
Securities regulation is similarly divided between the federal government
and the states, although in recent years the state’s role has been significantly
84

156 CONG. REC. 8193 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 16, at 958–61 (discussing expertise and local knowledge); Daniel A. Lyons, Federalism and the Rise of Renewable Energy: Preserving State and Local
Voices in the Green Energy Revolution, 64 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1619, 1652 (2014) (discussing local knowledge in context of optimal energy policy).
86 See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. 8193 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
87 Id. at 7671–72.
88 See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
89 Are All Commercial Banks Regulated and Supervised by the Federal Reserve System, or
Just Major Commercial Banks?, FED. RSRV. BANK S.F., https://www.frbsf.org/education/publi
cations/doctor-econ/2006/november/commercial-banks-regulation/ [perma.cc/89WT-8FJE].
90 Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 536 (2009) (rejecting OCC claim that National Bank Act preempts states from enforcing state banking laws against national banks);
Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 (2007) (holding National Bank Act preempts
state laws regulating state subsidiaries of national banks engaged in real estate lending); see
Metzger, supra note 73, at 583; see also Wilmarth, supra note 70, at 896.
91 Metzger, supra note 73, at 583.
92 S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 76 (2010).
85

22 NEV. L.J. 303

Fall 2021]

STATES AND SYSTEMIC RISK

317

circumscribed. Congress enacted the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts to create a
uniform system of national regulation supplemented by pre-existing state securities laws.93 While federal and state regulators coexisted side by side for several
decades, Congress began preempting state securities laws in the mid-1990s, particularly regarding securities registration and litigation of fraud claims.94 By
2002, “it would be most descriptively accurate to say that federal securities law
has occupied the securities field and that state law development has been marginal,”95 although the years immediately preceding the economic crisis saw a
renewed effort by some states to enforce consumer protection statutes against
major players.96
By comparison, insurance law has been regulated primarily by the states.97
Since 1945, the McCarran-Ferguson Act placed insurance regulation squarely in
state regulators’ hands by adopting a reverse-preemption provision that prohibits
the federal government from invalidating, impairing, or superseding state insurance laws unless the federal law “specifically relates to the business of insurance.”98 While commentators advocated for a stronger federal presence as markets became more intertwined and risk grew more complex,99 those pleas largely
fell on deaf ears until the Dodd-Frank Act.100 And even the Act itself seems content to adjust jurisdiction only at the margins: it potentially subjects to the Council’s jurisdiction large insurance companies like AIG, whose failure might pose
a systemic risk to the economy, and establishes a Federal Insurance Office to
gather information, but otherwise leaves the insurance industry intact.101 The
Conference Committee rejected a provision in the Senate version of the bill that
would have created a stronger National Insurance Office with explicit authority
to preempt some state insurance laws.102 Even the Federal Insurance Office’s

93

See Jones, supra note 11, at 111–12.
Id. at 114–15.
95 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SECURITIES
REGULATION 2 (2002).
96 See Jones, supra note 11, at 115.
97 Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of Insurance: Federalism
in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 837–40, 878 (2006).
98 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15; see McCoy, supra note 11, at 1394.
99 See, e.g., Jerry & Roberts, supra note 97, at 837.
100 “Apart from . . . limited federal incursions, the states succeeded brilliantly in fending off
federal encroachment in insurance regulation through 2010.” McCoy, supra note 11, at 1396.
101 As discussed in greater detail below, the designation of larger insurers as systemically
important financial institutions subject to Council oversight could be the proverbial camel’s
nose under the tent for federal insurance regulation. See id. at 1393 (“In short, systemic risk
regulation by the federal government . . . is a game changer. It is likely to transform the locus
of insurance regulation both in ways that are predictable and others that are not. Yet the larger
implications of this change for continued state dominance in insurance regulation are not well
recognized. To that extent, federal oversight of systemic risk in insurance has the stealth potential to affect the insurance industry by imposing certain federal regulatory standards industry wide.”).
102 See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 502 (as amended by the Senate, May 20, 2010).
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own mission statement recognized that “[i]nsurance is primarily regulated by the
individual States.”103
Thus, while federal regulators have varying levels of experience regulating
the three primary industries falling under the Council’s purview, state regulators
have continuously operated in areas not preempted by federal law and have developed expertise that federal regulators lack. That expertise is particularly valuable given the fact that in all three fields, state regulators were actively pursuing
enforcement actions in the years leading up to the crisis, sometimes in the face
of opposition from their federal counterparts.104 In all three industries, the states’
experience would help inform the Council’s perspective on systemic risk. In the
insurance industry, the state perspective is critical, while in securities and banking it appears more complementary to that of federal regulators.
2. Local Knowledge
The other advantage that state regulators bring to the Council is local
knowledge. State regulators are responsible for a smaller constituency than their
federal counterparts, which puts them in a better position to know and respond
to local needs.105 Barry Friedman notes that state representatives “ought to look
their constituents in the eye on the street and see them in the grocery store.”106
While this vignette may be a bit exaggerated when applied to state financial regulators, the larger point remains that state officials are better informed of the
unique needs of their constituents.107
By sharing this local knowledge with the Council, state regulators can
achieve two related goals. First, it can make the Council aware of issues that are
of particular importance to that state’s population but are not shared with the
population as a whole. Because federal regulators have their gaze fixed at the
national level, they are unlikely to notice the idiosyncratic needs of only a portion
of the marketplace. By giving state regulators a seat at the table, the Act provides
a conduit by which that local knowledge could flow up from individual state
regulators through their designated representatives to be shared with their national counterparts.108
Second, a state regulator can inform the Council of trends that are developing on the state level but are not yet widespread enough to demand a national

103

See Randy Gray, One Click is Enough: Satisfying FDA’s Fair Balance in the Highly-Regulated Marketplace, 39 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 95, 95, 118 n.126 (2013) (quoting Federal Insurance Office Mission Statement).
104 See supra text accompanying notes 90–92, 96; see also S. REP. NO. 111–176, at 16 (2010).
105 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 59
(2004).
106 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 395 (1997).
107 Daniel A. Lyons, Technology Convergence and Federalism: Who Should Decide the Future of Telecommunications Regulation?, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 383, 424 (2010).
108 Id.
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regulator’s attention. Senator Collins referred to this insight when calling for the
state regulators to be added to the Council:
State banking, insurance, and securities regulators are on the front lines of financial regulation and therefore have information and perspectives that are necessary
components of an effective regulatory structure. State regulators could act as “first
responders” to the Council, in that they see trends developing at the State level.
They could serve as an early warning system, identifying practices and risk-related trends that are substantial contributing factors to systemic risk.109

The ability to identify signs foreshadowing impending danger, like the proverbial canary in the coal mine, is of tremendous value to a body whose task is
to gather information on potential risks to the national economy. In terms of both
expertise and local knowledge, the Financial Stability Oversight Council would,
at least in theory, benefit from the participation of state regulators as nonvoting
members.
B. Potential Concerns
Not everyone agreed, however, that integrating state regulators within the
decision-making organ of a federal agency is wise or permissible.110 The DoddFrank Act included a variety of creative new legislative solutions and administrative structures, which prompted numerous questions—and lawsuits—about
whether Congress had stretched beyond what was permissible or prudent.111 The
Financial Stability Oversight Council was not immune from this phenomenon.112
One might put the various objections to the Council in two buckets: formalist
and functionalist concerns. The two buckets have different methodologies, but
both lines of inquiry point to the same basic concern, namely the potential that
states have too much influence over a federal decision-making body.
1. States and the Appointment Power
The formalist challenge to the Financial Stability Oversight Council involves the method by which the state regulators are appointed.113 The Dodd109

156 CONG. REC. 8193 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PENN. L. REV.
841, 904 (2014) (discussing concerns); State Nat’l Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp.
2d 127, 136–39 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(raising Appointments Clause challenge).
111 See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (finding
structure of Bureau, created by Dodd-Frank Act, violated separation of powers); Thomas W.
Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the
Constitution?, 163 U. PENN. L. REV. 165, 173 (2014). See generally Arielle Rabinovitch, Constitutional Challenges to Dodd-Frank, 58 ANTITRUST BULL. 635 (2013) (collecting arguments
and cases).
112 See O’Connell, supra note 110, at 904.
113 It is worth noting that there may be a separate Appointments Clause issue about the DoddFrank Act’s decision to expand the duties of existing federal officers. When the Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve Board chairman, and the other voting members were appointed to
110
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Frank Act contemplates that the three state regulatory members will be chosen
by their peers to serve a two-year period on the Council.114 In practice, this appointment power has fallen on three organizations whose primary purpose is to
represent their member state regulators at the national level: the North American
Securities Administrators Association, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.115 This unusual
process at least raises questions about whether the statute is compatible with the
Appointments Clause, which requires that all principal officers be selected by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.116 This claim was
brought as part of a wholesale attack on the legality of the Dodd-Frank Act in
State National Bank of Big Spring v. Geithner,117 though the court dismissed the
claim for lack of standing without reaching the merits.118
At first glance, this seems an unusual line of attack, as the Appointments
Clause is often classified as a bulwark protecting the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches.119 This typology is not surprising,
given that many significant cases interpreting the Clause have involved congressional attempts to usurp the appointment power to itself. For example, the landmark Appointments Clause case Buckley v. Valeo120 invalidated a law that vested
the appointment of four Federal Election Commission members in the President

their positions with the advice and consent of the Senate, they were appointed to fulfill specific
agency responsibilities and were judged based upon their fitness for those positions. The
Dodd-Frank Act dramatically expanded each voting member’s responsibilities by adding to
their portfolios the additional duties that come with being a member of the Council. The Supreme Court has held that if Congress creates enough additional duties or authority for an
officer as to effectively create a new office, the officeholder must be reappointed and reconfirmed. See, e.g., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 173–74 (1994); Shoemaker v. United
States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893). See generally Matthew Hunter, Note, Legislating Around
the Appointments Clause, 91 B.U. L. REV. 753, 764–65 (2011). This analysis, which turns on
whether the new duties are “germane” to the officer’s preexisting commitments, lies beyond
the scope of this Article.
114 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1392–93 (2010) (codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2)).
115 See, e.g., State Regulators Announce Representatives for the Financial Stability Oversight
Council, NORTH AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.nasaa.org/1520/state-r
egulators-announce-representatives-for-the-financial-stability-oversight-council/ [perma.cc/Z
963-2NSU].
116 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see O’Connell, supra note 110, at 904.
117 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 21–22, 29, State Nat’l Bank of Big
Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 795 F.3d 48
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (No. 12-01032).
118 Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d, at 139.
119 See, e.g., Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conserv. Plan. Council,
786 F.2d 1359, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The appointments clause is addressed to the separation of powers between the President and Congress.”)
120 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, rather than in the President or some other permissible entity.121
But pigeonholing the Appointments Clause as simply a safeguard against
congressional hegemony reads the text too narrowly.122 By “limit[ing] the universe of eligible recipients of the power to appoint,” the Appointments Clause
“prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely” to anyone.123 Thus, while
the restriction prevents Congress from allowing itself to appoint federal officers,
it also prevents that body in most circumstances from vesting the appointment
power in other entities as well. These limits are “among the significant structural
safeguards of the constitutional scheme” and are “designed to preserve political
accountability relative to important Government assignments.”124
The concern with vesting the appointment of federal officers in the states
would not seem foreign to the founders, who debated this very question. During
the Constitutional Convention, Virginia’s Edmund Randolph observed the “formidable” nature of the President’s appointment power and suggested that the
legislature should be “left at liberty to refer appointments in some cases, to some
State Authority.”125 John Dickenson of Delaware then moved to amend the Appointments Clause to add “except where by law the appointment shall be vested
in the Legislatures or Executives of the several States.”126 This amendment
would thus have allowed Congress to vest appointment of federal officers in state
legislatures or with state governors.127 But several members objected to this state
intrusion into the federal sphere. Gouverneur Morris claimed the amendment
would “be putting it in the power of the States to say, ‘You shall be the viceroys
but we will be the viceroys over you,’ ” while James Wilson noted that state legislatures would quickly instruct their senators to make sure any office Congress
121

Id. at 126–27. The decision also held that although the President got to nominate the remaining two FEC commissioners, those appointments were also invalid because the Act required concurrence by both the Senate and the House, rather than the Senate alone. Id. at 126–
28.
122 See Seattle Master Builders Ass’n, 786 F.2d at 1374, n.3 (Beezer, J., dissenting) (“Congressional authority would be enhanced at the expense of the executive if Congress had the
unrestricted power to confer the appointment authority on third parties. To the extent that a
governor can appoint a [federal officer] who would otherwise be subject to the Appointments
Clause, the power of the executive branch is diminished. . . . Indeed, the Framers expressly
rejected the idea that the Appointments Clause is not violated so long as Congress does not
arrogate to itself the power to appoint or remove federal officers.”).
123 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991).
124 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659, 663 (1997); see also Freytag, 501 U.S. at
880 (“The structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of any one
branch of Government but of the entire Republic.”). The Freytag Court explained that the
Appointments Clause would be equally violated whether Congress improperly vested the appointment power in itself or in another position prohibited by the Clause’s text, including an
inappropriate member of the executive branch.
125 MAX FARRAND, 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 405 (1911); see Seattle Master Builders Ass’n, 786 F.2d at 1374 n.3 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
126 FARRAND, supra note 125, at 406.
127 Id.
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creates would vest the appointment power in the states.128 The amendment was
soundly defeated.129
Wilson’s comment highlights the fact that, under the original framework, the
states maintained some indirect influence over federal appointments. Prior to the
enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, senators were chosen by state
legislatures.130 Because of the Senate’s advice and consent authority,131 this procedure gave state legislatures as a whole a veto over the selection of federal officers. But most considered this power too remote to be concerning.132 The framers felt that Senate consent would be useful for small states to combat the
political tendencies of the President to fill federal positions primarily with nominees from larger states.133 They also felt the Senate, as a collegial and deliberative body, would prevent the President from appointing unqualified nominees on
the basis of personal ties, state prejudice, or popular will.134 But there seemed to
be little concern that the Senate’s advice-and-consent role, alone, would lead to
inappropriate state interference into the federal sphere. Direct state appointments
of federal officials, however, would be more problematic because it would
muddy the boundary between the federal government and the states.135
Modern scholars have argued that the Appointments Clause serves two primary purposes,136 both of which are implicated by a state appointment power.
The first, hinted at above, is an anti-aggrandizement principle. As Justice David
Souter explained in Weiss v. United States,137 one purpose of the Appointments
Clause is to prevent one branch of government from aggrandizing the appointment power at the expense of another.138 “Congress . . . may not unilaterally fill
any federal office; and the President may neither select a principal officer without
the Senate’s concurrence, nor fill any office without Congress’s authorization.”139 By unilaterally appointing a particular federal official, a branch could
wield considerable influence over how the officer’s duties are carried out.140
128

Id.
Id. at 418–19.
130 U.S. CONST. art. I § 3 cl. 1.
131 See id. art. II § 2 cl. 2.
132 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 66, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
133 See, e.g., Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and Consent”:
A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 113 (2005); James E.
Gauch, Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 337, 347–51 (1989).
134 THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton).
135 See supra text accompanying note 128.
136 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 113, at 763–65.
137 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 182 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring).
138 Id. at 186; see Walter E. Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the
President and Congress, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 521 (2000).
139 Weiss, 510 U.S. at 187 (Souter, J., concurring).
140 As Justice Souter notes, the Appointments Clause is less concerned with aggrandizement
of the power to appoint inferior officers, which Congress can choose to vest in the President
129
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It is not difficult to imagine instances in which states granted an appointment
power would exercise it for self-interested purposes. Federal agencies play the
predominant role today in statutory interpretation and therefore increasingly represent the most likely locus of power to preempt state law.141 It is no stretch to
think that state officials, if given the power to appoint those who would exercise
that power, would prefer individuals less inclined toward preemption, even if
those individuals were otherwise less qualified or if preemption represented the
optimal policy choice for the country as a whole.
The Appointments Clause also helps ensure political accountability. As one
of the more detailed constitutional provisions, the Clause delineates which segment of the government is responsible for creating an office and which is responsible for staffing it, so the public knows who to hold accountable in the event that
a particular officer or agency goes astray.142 This rationale, too, is implicated by
the prospect of state appointment of federal officials. In another context, the Supreme Court has prohibited federal programs from commandeering state officials
to carry out federal mandates, in part because of concern that the public will
unfairly fault state officials for unpopular federal decisions.143 The inverse dynamic could occur if states use the appointment power to install federal officials
to carry out a state’s agenda. James Madison’s famous ode to the separation of
powers in Federalist 51 highlights the importance of dividing power both within
the federal government and between the government and the states:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first
divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.144

To avoid muddying this division of authority and jeopardizing the benefits
of divided government, Madison advised that “the members of each [department]
have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.”145
2. Are Nonvoting Members Officers of the United States?
By integrating active state regulatory officials into a federal agency, the
Dodd-Frank Act has waded into a decades-long conversation about the scope of
alone, in heads of departments, or in courts of law. Id. at 183. Presumably, this is because
inferior officers, by definition, wield less power than principal officers, so controlling personnel decisions of these lesser offices would not threaten the balance of powers among the
branches.
141 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521, 523 (2012).
142 Hunter, supra note 113, at 764–65.
143 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
144 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added).
145 Id. at 239.
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the Appointments Clause. Buckley v. Valeo held that the Clause applies to “any
appointee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States.”146 Despite repeated entreaties from academy, bench, and bar, the Supreme Court has explicitly declined to elaborate on the meaning of “significant
authority,”147 stating tartly in its latest decision on the subject in 2018 that
“maybe one day we will see a need to refine or enhance the test Buckley set out
so concisely. But that day is not this one . . . .”148 And as Anne Joseph O’Connell
points out, the inquiry is further complicated when that authority is wielded by a
non-federal actor such as a state official.149
a. Status as State Official
Under the Clinton Administration Office of Legal Counsel’s interpretation,
active state officials might not fall under the Appointments Clause even if they
exercise significant authority under Buckley. In The Constitutional Separation of
Powers Between the President and Congress, the OLC argued that the Appointments Clause is limited only to those officers who are “appoint[ed] to a position
of employment within the federal government.”150 “The Appointments Clause
simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved upon non-federal
actors.”151 The memo further asserted that “[i]t is conceptual confusion to argue
that federal laws delegating authority to state officials create federal ‘offices’ . . . . Rather, the ‘public station, or employment’ has been created by state
law; the federal statute simply adds federal authority to a pre-existing state office.”152
The Clinton-era OLC opinion finds some support in a Ninth Circuit decision,
Seattle Master Builders v. Pacific Northwest Electrical Power & Conservation
Planning Council.153 Plaintiffs had challenged the constitutionality of a council
charged with preparing a conservation and energy usage plan for the Pacific
Northwest in consultation with the Bonneville Power Administration, a federal
agency under the umbrella of the Department of Energy.154 The Council was established by an act of Congress but was staffed by appointees selected by four
governors whose states opted into participation via state legislation.155 The Court
146

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (“Both the amicus and the Government urge
us to elaborate on Buckley’s ‘significant authority’ test, but another of our precedents makes
that project unnecessary.”).
148 Id. at 2052.
149 O’Connell, supra note 110, at 903.
150 The Const. Separation of Powers Between the President and Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124,
145 (1996) [hereinafter Clinton OLC Memo].
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power & Conserv. Plan. Council, 786 F.2d
1359 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 Id. at 1362.
155 Id.
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found that, although the Council was charged with a regional mandate by Congress and coordinated with a federal agency, it was properly considered an interstate compact rather than a federal agency.156 As a result, the Council members
do not “perform their duties pursuant to the laws of the United States” but instead
“pursuant to a compact which requires both state legislation and congressional
approval.”157 It also noted that “[t]he appointment, salaries and direction of the
Council members are state-derived” and that concerns about separation of powers were “not implicated here” because “Congress has not arrogated to itself a
power that would otherwise be exercised by the President.”158
The Clinton-era memo disavowed an earlier 1990 OLC memo that argued
that “[t]he Appointments Clause has both a ‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ role to play
in the separation of powers” and that “[v]ertically, the clause protects against the
delegation of federal executive authority to private entities outside the constitutional framework.”159 While the memo focused primarily upon outsourcing government work to private contractors, O’Connell suggests that the same logic
could limit the devolving of federal authority to state actors.160
The current OLC memo strikes a somewhat frustrating middle ground. Unlike the Clinton-era memo, the OLC currently suggests that “a position, however
labeled, is in fact a federal office if (1) it is invested by legal authority with a
portion of the sovereign powers of the federal Government, and (2) it is ‘continuing.’ ”161 This language would suggest that the operative inquiry should focus
on the duties of the official in question, not the status of his or her employment.
But somewhat inconsistently, it goes on to state that “an individual . . . who possesses his authority from a state does not hold a position with delegated sovereign
authority of the federal Government and therefore does not hold a federal office.”162
While the current OLC guidance is thus ambiguous as to the status of state
officials generally, this debate is likely inapposite to the specific case of the Financial Stability Oversight Council. Although discussing state officers in seemingly sweeping terms, the Clinton OLC memo distinguishes between an “individual who is appointed to his or her office by the federal government” and
regimes wherein “significant authority is devolved upon non-federal actors.”163
This distinction reflects the typical cooperative federalism structure wherein federal decisionmakers set policy and delegate authority to state officials, in their
156

Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1365 (internal quotations omitted).
158 Id.
159 Const. Limits on “Contracting Out” Dep’t of Just. Functions Under OMB Circular A-76,
14 Op. O.L.C. 94, 96 (1990).
160 O’Connell, supra note 110, at 903.
161 Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73,
73–74 (2007) [hereinafter Officers OLC Memo].
162 Id. at 77.
163 Clinton OLC Memo, supra note 150, at 145.
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capacity as state officials, to carry out those federal mandates.164 For example, to
enforce the new federal interconnection mandate between local telephone companies, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 appointed state public utilities commissions to arbitrate disputes between parties, pursuant to guidelines established
by the Federal Communications Commission.165 The Financial Stability Oversight Council departs from this model in a way that conflates the OLC memo’s
two categories: it does not charge state regulators in their pre-existing capacity
with enforcing a federal policy, but instead invites them to participate as members of a new federal agency to create those policies.166 Because the Council is a
new federal agency, its positions are likely new “offices,” and therefore, each
member is “appointed to his or her office by the federal government.”167 Seattle
Master Builders is not inapposite: the key question in that case was whether the
regional council was an interstate compact or a new federal agency; if it had been
an agency, its members would have been susceptible to an Appointments Clause
challenge despite the fact that they had been appointed by state governors.168
b. Significant Authority
The more significant question, therefore, is whether the state appointees and
the other nonvoting members exercise “significant authority” under Buckley.169
Buckley’s conclusory analysis of this issue provides little guidance regarding
how to draw the line between an officer and a mere employee.170 But the remedial
portion of the opinion provides some clues. Having found that the members of
the Federal Election Commission were unconstitutionally appointed, the Court
could not simply rewrite the statute’s appointment procedure, so instead, it reduced the commissioners’ powers that led to their classification as officers rather
than employees.171 After all, if one’s duties do not rise to the level of an officer
but are instead “part of the broad swath of ‘lesser functionaries’ in the Government’s workforce,” then “the Appointments Clause cares not a whit about who
named them.”172 Buckley distinguished between the FEC’s enforcement powers
(in particular, its ability to bring suits to enforce election law) from those duties

164

See Weiser, supra note 17, at 665.
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371–73 (1999).
166 See text accompanying notes 41–46.
167 Clinton OLC Memo, supra note 150, at 145.
168 See Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pac. Nw. Elec. Power and Conserv. Plan. Council,
786 F.2d 1359, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1986).
169 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
170 See Landry v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1132–33 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting
that Buckley is an “attempt to clarify” the “circular logic” of earlier opinions on this topic). To
be fair, the Buckley Court felt little need to dwell on this question in the course of its hundredplus pages of analysis because the parties did not contest that the commissioners were officers
rather than employees. See also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162.
171 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137–38.
172 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126 n.162).
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that are “of an investigative and informative nature.”173 Enforcement is an executive function that an officer could perform.174 But mere investigation and advisement duties were permissible because they “fall[] in the same general category as those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its own
committees.”175 Moreover, while the Commission’s “broad administrative powers” such as “rulemaking, advisory opinions, and determinations of eligibility”
for federal office or funding are more “legislative or judicial in nature,” they
nonetheless retain an executive flavor and do not “merely operate[] in aid of congressional authority.”176 Therefore, only an officer may perform these duties as
well.
If the state regulators were voting members of the Financial Stability Oversight Council, they would unquestionably be considered officers under Buckley
and therefore violate the Appointments Clause. Like the FEC Commissioners,
the Council’s voting members can conduct investigations,177 issue rules (such as
the standards for determining when a nonbank financial company poses a threat
to America’s financial stability),178 and adjudicate individual cases (for example,
designating particular nonbank financial companies under those standards).179 It
was likely this concern that Senator Collins had in mind when she suggested in
Committee that “I think those State regulators should be brought on to the council in a nonvoting capacity given the constitutional issues.”180
Collins’s assumption finds some support in the 2007 OLC memo. Expanding
on the Buckley test, the memo explains that an officer must have received “a
delega[tion of] legal authority of a portion of the sovereign powers of the federal
Government.”181 “Delegated sovereign authority,” in turn, is defined as “power
lawfully conferred by the Government to bind third parties, or the Government
itself, for the public benefit.”182 By contrast, says the memo, “an individual who
occupies a purely advisory position (one having no legal authority) . . . does not
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Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.
Id. at 140.
175 Id. at 137.
176 Id. at 140–41.
177 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 112(a)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
178 Id. § 113; see Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 71,740 (Dec. 30, 2019).
179 Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2)(H) (“The Council shall . . . require supervision by the Board
of Governors for nonbank financial companies that may pose risks to the financial stability of
the United States in the event of their material financial distress or failure, or because of their
activities pursuant to section 113.”); id. § 113(a) (“The Council . . . may determine that a U.S.
nonbank financial company shall be supervised by the Board of Governors and shall be subject
to prudential standards, in accordance with this title.”).
180 156 CONG. REC. 7672 (2010) (statement of Sen. Susan Collins).
181 Officers OLC Memo, supra note 161, at 77.
182 Id. at 87 (“[S]uch authority primarily involves the authority to administer, execute, or interpret the law.”).
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hold a position with delegated sovereign authority of the federal Government and
therefore does not hold a federal office.”183
But the OLC memo lacks the force of law, and Supreme Court precedent
cuts against this categorical rule. In Freytag v. Commissioner, the government
argued that special trial judges of the Tax Court were employees rather than officers because they “lack authority to enter a final decision” in significant cases,
instead making recommended rulings to tax court judges.184 But the Court found
that despite the inability to bind parties, these judges exercised “significant authority” by taking testimony, conducting trials, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and possessing the ability to enforce discovery orders.185 The Court noted
in the alternative that these special judges could render final decisions in smaller
cases,186 leading some later courts to hold that final decision-making authority
was a necessary element.187 But the Supreme Court clarified in Lucia v. SEC that
Freytag “explicitly rejects [the] theory that final decision-making authority is a
sine qua non of officer status.”188
An earlier D.C. Circuit decision casts greater doubt that merely making a
position nonvoting is sufficient to insulate it from Appointments Clause scrutiny.
In Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund,189 plaintiffs
challenged the FEC’s constitutionality because the Secretary of the Senate and
the Clerk of the House of Representatives served as ex officio members.190 The
government argued that their participation in Commission deliberations posed
no constitutional problem because they could not vote, could not chair the meeting, could not call or adjourn a meeting, and were not counted in determining a
quorum.191 But the court disagreed, finding that Congress intended the ex officio
members to participate in Commission deliberations and specifically to represent
Congress’s views on matters before the agency.192 While the members were intended to “play a mere ‘informational or advisory role’ in agency decision-
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Id. at 87.
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
185 Id. at 881–82.
186 Id. at 882.
187 See Landry v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding
administrative law judges were mere employees because, unlike in Freytag, they issued only
a “recommended decision, recommended findings of fact, recommended conclusions of law,
and [a] proposed order” to agency officials (alteration in original) (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 308.38
(1996))).
188 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052–53 n.4. Writing in dissent, Justice Sotomayor would
have held that “one requisite component of ‘significant authority’ is the ability to make final,
binding decisions on behalf of the Government. Accordingly, a person who merely advises
and provides recommendations to an officer would not herself qualify as an officer.” Id. at
2065 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
189 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
190 Id. at 823.
191 Id. at 826.
192 Id.
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making,”193 the court found that this implied that they had “some influence” over
the Commission’s deliberations.194 Because the ex officio members had “the potential to influence the other commissioners,” their appointment was unconstitutional.195
Despite this uncertainty, the Council’s nonvoting members are unlikely to
be considered federal officers. Unlike the special judges in Freytag and Lucia,
the state regulator members do not exercise “substantial powers” involving “significant discretion” in pursuit of “important functions.”196 They do not conduct
trials, rule on admissibility of evidence, or issue recommended decisions.197 Instead, they seem more akin to duties “essentially of an investigative and informative nature” that Buckley found to be on the “employee” side of the constitutional
line.198 Statutorily, they are charged with serving “in an advisory capacity,”199
providing information to the voting members of the Council to help inform their
deliberations—a service “in the same general category as those powers which
Congress might delegate to one of its own committees.”200 Of course, they actively participate in the Council’s deliberations.201 But unlike the voting members, the nonvoting members are not required to submit an annual report to Congress certifying the Council’s compliance with its duties or noting areas of
disagreement,202 suggesting that their responsibilities are limited to an advisory
role with regard to the Council’s more executive duties, much as a legislative
committee is to the body as a whole.
Of course, the Council itself exercises significant authority, and like the ex
officio FEC members in NRA Political Victory Fund, the nonvoting members
have “the potential to influence the other commissioners” in their deliberations.203 But a closer examination reveals that this opinion was concerned primarily about Congress asserting itself into the Commission’s deliberations. The
court repeatedly emphasized that the ex officio members were “agents of
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Id. at 827.
Id. at 826.
195 Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case, 512 U.S. 1218 (1994), but later dismissed it as improvidently granted because the FEC had improperly sought certiorari on its
own, and the Solicitor General (who should have filed the petition for certiorari) ratified the
agency’s action after the filing date had passed. See FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513
U.S. 88 (1994).
196 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2052 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882
(1991)).
197 Id. at 2052.
198 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976).
199 Dodd-Frank Act Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
200 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 137.
201 See Dodd-Frank Act § 111(b)(3) (“The nonvoting members of the Council shall not be
excluded from any of the proceedings, meetings, discussions, or deliberations of the Council,”
with limited exceptions.).
202 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112(b); Council Bylaws, supra note 46, at § XXX.3.
203 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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Congress.”204 The court cited the Constitution’s “structural ban on legislative intrusions into other governmental functions” and explained that “the mere presence of agents of Congress on an entity with executive powers offends the Constitution.”205 The court was concerned about congressional influence in particular
because “Congress enjoys ample channels to advise, coordinate, and even directly influence an executive agency” through oversight hearings, appropriations, authorization of legislation, or direct communication with the agency.206
Given the plethora of powers already at Congress’s disposal, Congress in particular must “limit the exercise of its influence . . . to its legislative role.”207 The
NRA court seemed focused not on whether the ex officio members exceeded the
appropriate sphere of their authority, but whether Congress had exceeded its appropriate sphere. The Dodd-Frank Act does not raise similar concerns about Congress giving itself a seat at the Council, so the opinion seems less relevant.
3. Preferential Access by the Intergovernmental Lobby
But the NRA Political Victory Fund decision raises an important pragmatic
concern, even if it does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The
court was undeniably correct that nonvoting members have at least “the potential
to influence” an agency’s decisions.208 The Dodd-Frank Act effectively granted
three special interest groups—the North American Securities Administrators Association, the Conference of State Bank Supervisors, and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners—permanent seats at the Council table.209
These groups are part of the informal collection of entities known as the “intergovernmental lobby,” whose influence is “widely acknowledged and respected
in Washington.”210 Some may question whether it is wise to give these lobbyist
groups unique and ongoing access to the most important financial regulators in
the American government, for at least two reasons.
First, giving state voices preferential access to the Council can tilt the conversation toward protecting state interests, even when preemption is the optimal
policy. The intergovernmental lobby is a fierce and effective advocate of state
autonomy. As Miriam Seifter explains, because these interest groups must forge
consensus among disparate members to speak with one voice, “the groups’ advocacy tends toward lowest-common-denominator positions that members can
204
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209 See, e.g., Press Release, State Regulators Announce Representatives for the Financial Stability Oversight Council (Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.nasaa.org/1520/state-regulators-annou
nce-representatives-for-the-financial-stability-oversight-council/ [perma.cc/SAW4-K9M2].
210 Kramer, supra note 62, at 285. See generally Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in
the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 953 (2014); Note, The Lesson of Lopez: The
Political Dynamics of Federalism’s Political Safeguards, 119 HARV. L. REV. 609, 622 (2005).
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agree upon, often addressing the importance of state authority.”211 For example,
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors adopted a Statement of Principles asserting that “[b]ank supervision is best conducted at the state level” and “[b]road
federal regulatory preemption of state laws endangers the dual banking system
and consumer protection.”212 It is in their collective self-interest to promote state
autonomy and resist preemption before the Council. In a sense, this is the potential downside to the benefits described in Section II.A.213 Giving state regulators
a place at the Council table provides a conduit for state expertise and local
knowledge—and also self-interested advocacy.
The law has long recognized the danger of special influence access to agency
decisionmakers. The D.C. Circuit has criticized the related practice of ex parte
presentations because these representations have not been tested for truth by the
public comment process, putting them at risk for unreliability.214 It also threatens
public confidence in agency deliberations: “Even the possibility that there is here
one administrative record for the public and this court and another for the Commission and those ‘in the know’ is intolerable.”215
Typically, the remedy for these concerns is disclosure—but in this case, that
remedy is stymied by the fact that the Council is exempt from the Government
in the Sunshine Act.216 By its terms, the Sunshine Act applies only to agencies
“headed by a collegial body composed of two or more individual members, a
majority of whom are appointed to such position by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate.”217 While the Council’s voting members do experience nomination and Senate confirmation, they are not appointed directly to the
Council.218 Rather, they become members of the Council by virtue of their primary appointed positions.219 Because of this, they are not “appointed to such
position” in a way that triggers the Act.220 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act
211

Seifter, supra note 210, at 958.
CSBS Board Adopts Statement of Principles, STATESIDE NEWS & VIEWS (Conf. of State
Bank Supervisors, Washington, D.C.), November-December 2004, https://www.michigan.go
v/documents/CSBS_Stateside_News_&_Views,_November-December_2004_113607_7.pdf
[perma.cc/PT9M-DAC4].
213 See supra text accompanying notes 87–109.
214 See Home Box Off. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 52–55 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
215 Id. at 54.
216 See Martin E. Lybecker, American Bar Association Comments and Suggestions Concerning Consumer Protection Provisions in Title X of S. 3217, the Restoring American Financial
Stability Act of 2010, in DODD-FRANK FINANCIAL REFORM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE BANKING
INDUSTRY 381, 388 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study Materials SS038, 2010).
217 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1).
218 Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 111(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
219 Id.
220 See Lybecker, supra note 216. This is one reason why the reappointment question discussed supra note 113 may be of more than mere academic significance. If the officials’ current positions are not sufficiently germane to their primary appointments, and therefore reappointment and reconfirmation are necessary for the agency to take their posts, then the Council
might be subjected to the Sunshine Act.
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exempted the Council’s advisory committees—including those comprised of
state regulators—from compliance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act,221
which would otherwise require open meetings with advance notice and public
minutes.222 In lieu of these protections, the Council has adopted a Transparency
Policy that commits it to open meetings when possible but reserves the right to
close a meeting to the public upon the vote of a majority of members.223
Second, the intergovernmental lobby may not adequately convey the benefits sought from state participation. Seifter argues persuasively that because of
the pressure to speak with one voice, state interest groups “tend[] to squelch the
diversity of state perspectives” and “mute states’ varied knowledge.”224 To the
extent that the NASAA, CSBS, or NAIC provides guidance to its representative
on the Council, that guidance may not capture the local knowledge of individual
state regulators, as Senator Collins and other supporters of state participation
seek.225 And of course, in the absence of such guidance, the Council risks each
nonvoting member representing only the parochial interests of his or her state,
rather than the states as a whole.
III. DODD-FRANK’S COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE
The congressional architects of the Dodd-Frank Act hoped that by including
state regulators on the Council, the new agency’s processes would reflect a collaborative effort between federal and state regulators, especially on topics that
traditionally fell within the states’ sphere of influence, in the spirit of cooperative
federalism.226 Detractors feared that this access would give states an outsized
influence on Council deliberations: whether couched in formalist Appointments
Clause terms or more functionalist policy arguments, the concern was that allowing state regulators into the decision-making process would amplify states’
voices and influence.227
In retrospect, both these hopes and fears seem misplaced. The initial establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council was marked by friction
221

5 U.S.C. app.; see Dodd-Frank Act § 111(d).
5 U.S.C. app. § 10.
223 See Transparency Policy for the Financial Stability Oversight Council, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FSOCtransparencypolicy.pdf [perma.cc/L588-5NRQ].
224 Seifter, supra note 210, at 991, 996.
225 It appears that at least the NAIC has formal processes in place to facilitate the flow of
information from its members to its designated representative. For example, on the eve of
Council deliberations regarding proposed rules to govern nonbank companies, John Huff, the
Council’s nonvoting insurance regulator, solicited comments from other NAIC members, held
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comments and the proposed rule. See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, State Insurance Regulator
Comments Regarding FSOC Proposed Rule and Guidance, (Nov. 9, 2011) https://content.nai
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226 See supra text accompanying notes 79–85.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 113–18.
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between state regulators and their federal counterparts, particularly with inaugural Council Chairman Timothy Geithner.228 As the Council transitioned to investigation of the insurance industry—the financial services sector where federal
expertise was lowest and state regulators could prove valuable—the views of
state insurance regulators were marginalized.229 The Council designated insurance giants Prudential and MetLife as systemically important financial institutions over the objections of both the state insurance regulator and Independent
Insurance members, each of which criticized the Council for lacking an understanding of insurance markets.230 Ultimately, both decisions were reversed, in
part because of concerns cited by these dissenting members.231 When it came to
the Council’s foray into insurance, state voices were not too loud—if anything,
they were too soft.
A. Federal-State Friction During the FSOC’s Founding Phase
From the beginning, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner made clear that while
Congress wanted state regulators to play an integral role in the Council’s operations, the executive branch felt quite differently.232 Shortly after Director John
Huff took his seat as the state insurance regulators’ designated member, the
Treasury Department restricted Huff from consulting with other NAIC members
on Council matters.233 Geithner took the position that when on the Council, Huff
represented the state of Missouri, not the state insurance regulatory system as a
whole.234 Therefore, the Chairman asserted, it would be inappropriate for Huff
to share Council information with NAIC members, even on a confidential basis.235 His support was limited to three NAIC employees hired to support his
Council duties.236
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See infra text accompanying notes 232–36.
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230 See infra text accompanying notes 278–98.
231 See infra text accompanying notes 299–326.
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Director Huff testified before Congress about how these restrictions hampered his ability to execute his Council duties.237 During the first nine months he
was on the Council, Huff attended four full Council meetings and “innumerable
meetings and conference calls” involving the Council’s nine committees.238
Quite apart from the time commitment that this placed on Huff and his small
three-person staff, his contribution to these meetings was dampened because he
was unable to leverage “all the regulatory resources and expertise that [NAIC’s]
regulators can provide to FSOC’s important work in protecting the U.S. financial
system.”239 This, he argued, “contradicts Congressional intent and the deference
accorded to state insurance regulators in the explicit language of the statute itself.”240 After six months of negotiations, the NAIC finally took the extraordinary step of writing a public letter to Geithner, complaining that neither Huff nor
his three-person staff “can have the depth of knowledge with all insurance regulatory topics necessary for full, active, and effective participation in the activities
of FSOC.”241 It argued that Congress intended that the nonvoting member be
able to draw upon not only “assistance from insurance regulators in other states”
but also “experts from within their regulatory systems, from financial analysts to
investment experts to actuaries, to answer the tough questions and review the
data necessary to assess the entire breadth of the financial system.”242
Huff was quite right, of course, that these restrictions limit the state regulators’ ability to communicate their expertise and local knowledge to the Council
and thus impede on Congress’s intent that the Council benefit from a full and fair
presentation of the states’ perspectives.243 States are not monolithic actors, and
particularly in the fragmented market of insurance products, there is no reason to
believe that one regulator can draw upon his or her own experience alone to represent the interests of states as diverse as Missouri and New York. Congress determined that the nonvoting insurance regulator should be appointed by a process
that includes all insurance regulators, precisely because the position is intended
to represent the interests of the state insurance regulatory system, not just the
interests of one particular state.244 By limiting the flow of information between
the nonvoting member and the NAIC, Geithner’s restrictions limited the ability
of state regulators to share their expertise and local knowledge with the Council
during its deliberations.245 NAIC members routinely collaborate and share
237
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244 Huff noted in his congressional testimony that two staff members to the House Financial
Service Committee, James Segal of Rep. Frank’s staff and Eric Thompson of Rep. Bachus’s
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information, and as a result have protocols in place to address Geithner’s concerns about confidentiality.246
Tensions between the Treasury Department and the NAIC were heightened
by the slow pace of Council appointments. Although the Dodd-Frank Act provided for three insurance-related positions—the state regulator, the Director of
the Federal Insurance Office, and the Independent Member with Insurance Expertise—the executive branch dragged its feet on filling the final two seats.247
Geithner’s FIO Director appointee did not take office until June 2011, and the
White House did not nominate and confirm an Independent Member until September.248 This meant that for the Council’s first year, Huff was the Council’s
lone insurance voice, a fact that he noted in his 2011 testimony to Congress.249
NAIC President Susan Voss complained about both the restrictions on Huff and
the slow pace of appointments, which she “saw as a deliberate shutting-out of
state voices from the work of the nascent Financial Stability Oversight Council.”250 And as Huff noted in his testimony, the Council also declined to establish
any advisory committee of state regulators as provided for in the Dodd-Frank
Act.251
B. The Insurance Designation Decisions
This conflict continued to spill out into the public sphere as the Council took
up the question of whether particular insurance companies posed a systemic risk
to the American financial system. At first, the system seemed to work as Congress intended, as the Council’s state and federal members unanimously designated troubled insurer AIG as a systemically important financial institution
(“SIFI”) subject to federal oversight.252 But this unanimity hid deep, fundamental
disagreements about the nature and magnitude of risk in the insurance industry
generally. The Council’s subsequent decisions to similarly designate Prudential
and MetLife as SIFIs came over public objections by the Council’s Independent
246
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247 Jeff Jeffrey, McRaith May Shape New Federal Insurance Office’s Role, BESTWIRE, (June
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124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Member and state insurance regulator, who declared in no uncertain terms that
the Council’s analysis was “antithetical to a fundamental and seasoned understanding of the business of insurance [and] the insurance regulatory environment.”253
The designation of particular companies as systemically important financial
institutions is among the Council’s most important responsibilities. Seeking to
avoid a repeat of the Great Recession of 2008, when financial firms like Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers failed due to the bursting of the housing bubble
and in turn triggered a domino effect throughout financial markets,254 the DoddFrank Act directs the Council to designate a nonbank financial company as a
SIFI if it “determines that material financial distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or ‘the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the activities’ of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose
a threat to the financial stability of the United States.”255 This requires the Council to have a detailed understanding of the proposed SIFI’s industry and an appreciation of the risks that could jeopardize the company’s stability and the ripple
effect that a collapse would have on the financial sector.256 Designated firms are
subjected to oversight by the Federal Reserve and must comply with capital, liquidity, and risk-management requirements above and beyond those faced by
their non-SIFI peers to limit the risk that a failure would spread to the larger
economy.257
When considering whether to designate an insurance company as a SIFI,
collaboration with the state regulator is especially important because of the federal government’s lack of expertise in the area. As discussed above, unlike banking and securities regulation, insurance is primarily a state-regulated business
with no federal regulatory counterpart.258 This means there is no federal insurance regulator similar to the Federal Reserve or the Securities and Exchange
Commission to inform the decisions of the Council’s voting members. The
253
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insurance industry “is fundamentally different from the banking and securities
business models with distinguishing features and risks.”259 For example, unlike
banking and securities products, which are subject to withdrawal on demand,
insurance policies involve an upfront payment in exchange for a payout in the
event of a catastrophic event, meaning insurers face less risk of bank runs.260 As
Director Huff testified, “[the Council] must recognize and acknowledge these
differences in fulfilling its mission to monitor systemic risk within the U.S. financial system.”261 Moreover, state regulations typically require insurers to
maintain a diverse product mix, minimum capital requirements, and regular examinations, which the Council must understand and evaluate before determining
what extant risk is not currently captured by the regulatory environment.262
1. The AIG Decision
AIG was the first insurer to face Council scrutiny. This was unsurprising
given the company’s prominence in the headlines throughout the 2008 financial
crisis. Bad business decisions left the company overexposed to changes in the
housing market, leading to credit downgrades that forced the company to come
up with $75 billion in cash overnight to cover its collateral obligations.263 The
company faced bankruptcy, which would in turn have threatened the solvency of
its counterparties, who would have had to write down the company’s $441 billion
of credit default swap obligations.264 With markets still reeling from the news the
day before that venerable investment bank Lehman Brothers had collapsed, the
U.S. government agreed on September 16, 2008, to a federal bailout in exchange
for a 79.9% equity stake in AIG—a move that ultimately cost taxpayers $182
billion.265 As a “poster child” of the financial crisis, AIG was the primary reason
why the insurance industry was included in the discussion of Dodd-Frank reforms.266
Given that a significant purpose of the AIG bailout was to avoid contagion
into adjacent markets,267 it is unsurprising that the Council later concluded that
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“material financial distress at the company, if it were to occur, could pose a threat
to U.S. financial stability.”268 Specifically, the Council cited three “channels” by
which an AIG failure could spread to other entities:
•
•

•

Exposure: AIG counts a large number of corporate and financial entities
as customers.269 Material distress at AIG could cause these counterparties to write down the value of their AIG-related assets.270
Asset Liquidation: Though most retail insurance products are long-term
liabilities, customers often have the opportunity to cash them out
early.271 In the event of material distress, a panicked public could trigger
a large number of withdrawals in a short time, forcing AIG to liquidate
its assets to satisfy these obligations. A significant liquidation of AIG
assets could adversely affect the prices of those assets for other investors, reduce market-wide liquidity, and trigger a similar panic in the insurance industry generally (a hypothetical that some have dubbed a
“bank run” scenario).272
Critical Function or Service: AIG is America’s leading commercial insurance underwriter.273 If material distress caused it to default on its obligations, its competitors could not quickly fill this gap in the market,
leaving significant portions of commercial activity exposed to uninsured
risk.274

The decision noted AIG’s “meaningful non-insurance-related exposures,”275
which are typically subject to less regulatory oversight than its insurance products.276 Importantly, AIG did not contest the Council’s proposed designation of
the company as a SIFI entity,277 which may help explain why the Council decision was unanimous.

default could have triggered severe disruptions to an already distressed commercial paper market.”).
268 AIG Decision, supra note 252, at 1.
269 Id. at 3.
270 Id. at 5–6.
271 Id. at 7.
272 Id. at 7–8; see McCoy, supra note 11, at 1392.
273 AIG Decision, supra note 252, at 8.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 2.
276 J.P. Rankin, Fixing What Isn’t Broken: Why the Federal Reserve’s Potential Application
of Banking Standards on “Systemically Significant” Insurers Is an Unjustified Incursion that
May Negatively Impact Economic Stability, 23 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 40, 64–65 (2013).
277 AIG Decision, supra note 252, at 1 (“The Council provided AIG with an explanation of
the basis for the Council’s proposed determination. On July 3, 2013, the Council received a
letter from AIG stating that AIG had chosen not to contest the Council’s proposed determination.”).
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2. The Prudential Decision
The Council quickly followed by designating Prudential a SIFI two months
later, signaling concerns with the insurance industry beyond the troubled AIG.278
The Council’s concerns about Prudential mirrored those given in the AIG case.
Like AIG, Prudential offered a wide range of products to large corporate and
financial counterparties that could face significant losses if Prudential were to
suffer material distress.279 The Council highlighted, in particular, Prudential’s
derivatives counterparties and off-balance sheet exposures as vectors that could
spread Prudential’s distress to other financial markets.280 The Council also reiterated its concern about a “bank run” scenario in which distress could cause Prudential’s insurance customers to cash out their holdings early, triggering a Prudential asset fire sale that could spread through other financial sectors.281 Unlike
with AIG, the Council did not find that Prudential provided a critical service that
could not easily be replaced.282
Unlike the AIG case, the Prudential decision was not unanimous. Both the
Director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority and the Independent Member
with Insurance Expertise issued written dissents from the Council’s decision.283
Director Huff, the nonvoting state insurance commissioner, also published a
statement disagreeing with the Prudential designation.284 Huff criticized the
Council’s poor understanding of insurance markets:
[T]here appears to be a lack of recognition given to the nature of the insurance
business and the authorities and tools available to insurance regulators. Insurance
is not the same as a banking product yet the Statement of the Basis for the Council’s Final Determination . . . inappropriately applies bank-like concepts to insurance products and their regulation, rendering the rationale for designation flawed,
insufficient, and unsupportable.285

In particular, Huff criticized the Council’s “bank run” hypothetical as
“merely speculative” and “not supported by a sufficient understanding of the
278

The Council proposed designating both AIG and Prudential as SIFI entities on the same
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283 See Fin. Stability Oversight Council, Resolution Approving Final Determination Regarding Prudential Financial, Inc. (Sept. 19, 2013), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/counc
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heterogeneity of insurance products or insurer asset disposition.”286 He argued
that a mass panic-driven withdrawal was highly unlikely and that the Council
failed to demonstrate that either its hypothetical asset liquidation or exposure
events would be significant enough to pose a threat to America’s financial stability.287 And he asserted that the Council’s analysis mischaracterized and otherwise misunderstood the existing protections that state insurance regulators established to address financial instability.288 In short, the Council offered mere
speculation, rather than proof, that Prudential was “too big to fail.” Huff’s critique mirrored the dissent of Independent Member Roy Woodall, who stated
flatly:
Key aspects of [the Council’s] analysis are not supported by the record or actual
experience; and, therefore, are not persuasive. The underlying analysis utilizes
scenarios that are antithetical to a fundamental and seasoned understanding of the
business of insurance, the insurance regulatory environment, and the state insurance company resolution and guaranty fund systems.289

3. The MetLife Decision
The tension between the Council’s federal regulators and its nonvoting state
insurance regulator continued in the following year’s MetLife decision. As in the
earlier cases, the Council found that MetLife’s insurance and noninsurance products create exposure for large financial intermediaries, including globally systemically important banks and insurers.290 The Council also reiterated its concern
that a “bank run” on insurance deposits could trigger an asset liquidation that
could threaten other financial sectors.291 The Council found that MetLife’s securities lending and other capital markets activities could also precipitate a similar
asset liquidation event.292 Finally, it noted that MetLife’s complexity and intrafirm connections could aggravate these risks in the event of material distress.293
Again, Independent Member Woodall dissented,294 and North Dakota Insurance Commissioner Adam Hamm, who had taken over from Huff as the Council’s nonvoting state insurance member, published a lengthy statement disagreeing with the Council’s “fundamentally flawed” decision.295 Hamm noted
286
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MetLife’s argument, which went largely unaddressed in the decision, that the
likelihood of a MetLife failure is quite low and that the state insurance regulatory
framework reduces that likelihood further.296 But even assuming such an event,
the Council failed to prove that exposure by MetLife counterparties or asset liquidation would significantly impair the broader economy.297 “Unsubstantiated
qualitative statements describing ‘concerns,’ or ‘potential negative effects,’ ”
Hamm wrote, “should not be a substitute for robust quantitative analytics that
demonstrate scenarios that MetLife’s material financial distress could have substantial impacts to particular asset markets or the financial system as a whole.
Saying it does not make it so.”298
C. The Aftermath
The three insurance decisions signaled a potential sea of change in insurance
regulation. By subjecting America’s three largest insurers to oversight, the federal government “began to roll out a message to the industry about what sort of
prudence it expected, as well as what kind of size would amount to systemic
significance.”299 Analysts recognized that this use of systemic risk to increase
federal oversight of the insurance industry could be a “game changer,”300 shifting
the locus of insurance regulation away from the states over the explicit objection
of the state regulators that Congress intended to help inform the Council’s deliberations.
1. MetLife, Inc. v. Financial Stability Oversight Council
But the Council soon found that it ignored its state representatives at its peril.
Unlike AIG and Prudential, MetLife contested its designation by challenging the
Council’s decision in federal court.301 After lengthy deliberations, the court
found that the designation was arbitrary and capricious—citing many of the same
arguments pressed by Commissioner Hamm.302
First, the court found that under the Council’s prior guidance, it was required
to assess the likelihood of MetLife experiencing material distress before addressing the potential effect of that distress.303 In hearings before the Council, MetLife
296
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stressed that the likelihood of material distress was low.304 Commissioner Hamm
highlighted these arguments in his dissenting statement: he explained in depth
how “the state insurance regulatory framework . . . reduces the likelihood of failure.”305 Hamm also specifically criticized the Council for asserting that the probability of material distress was “an issue that the Council claims it does not have
to consider.”306
Second, and more significantly, the court faulted the Council for failing to
show with evidence how material distress at MetLife would threaten the stability
of the American financial system.307 And again, the court’s analysis echoes
points Hamm made before the agency. The court noted that “[t]he Exposure
channel analysis merely summed gross potential market exposures, without regard to collateral or other mitigating factors.”308 Hamm similarly asserted that
“the Council has failed to address the criticism that it did not conduct a robust
analysis of characteristics of MetLife beyond its size, particularly as it relates to
the exposure channel discussion.”309 Similarly, the court sharply criticized the
Council’s predictive judgments about contagion: “FSOC never projected what
the losses would be, which financial institutions would have to actively manage
their balance sheets, or how the market would destabilize as a result.”310 It went
on to state tartly that “[t]his Court cannot affirm a finding that MetLife’s distress
would cause severe impairment of financial intermediation or of financial market
functioning . . . when FSOC refused to undertake that analysis itself. Predictive
judgment must be based on reasoned predictions; a summary of exposures and
assets is not a prediction.”311 Hamm similarly criticized the Council for “continu[ing] to offer merely speculative outcomes . . . based in large part on hypothetical and highly implausible claims.”312 He argued that in any case, the Council should “set[] forth specific quantitative scenarios, based on reasonable, albeit
stressed assumptions, demonstrating that the material financial distress of the

refers to as the “First Designation”) or whether, because of the “nature, scope, size, scale,
concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of . . . activities” it might pose such a risk (a socalled “Second Designation,” a theory the Council declined to pursue in the insurance cases).
Dodd-Frank Act § 113(a). But in its interpretative guidance, the Council stated that it would
assess “the vulnerability of a nonbank financial company to financial distress.” The Court
faulted the Council for changing its position in the Final Determination without explanation.
MetLife, 177 F. Supp. 3d at 233.
304 See id. at 234–36.
305 Hamm MetLife Dissent, supra note 23, at 7.
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company meets the statutory standard.”313 By ruling for MetLife, the court
agreed.314
2. The Prudential Rescission Decision
Similarly, Director Huff’s dissent cast a long shadow in the Prudential case.
In 2017, seeking to take advantage of the MetLife decision and a more deregulatory atmosphere under President Trump, Prudential requested that the Council
reassess its status.315 In a sixty-six-page opinion, the Council agreed to the request, and in the process revisited many of the assumptions that drove its earlier
decision.316 In particular, the Council found that its original decision overestimated the magnitude of the “bank run” scenario, finding upon further analysis
that there is not significant risk that material distress would prompt retail policyholders to surrender their policies and trigger a liquidity crisis.317 It also concluded with respect to the exposure transmission channel that “[w]hile Prudential’s material financial distress could impose losses on pension plan sponsors,
retirement plan participants, and pension plan participants, the products do not
appear to contribute significantly to the threat that the company’s material financial distress could pose to U.S. financial stability.”318
As Jeremy Kress explains, Prudential stands in stark contrast to the Council’s other rescission decisions.319 With regard to AIG, GE Capital, and even
MetLife, the designation of SIFI status prompted the company to downsize and
reduce risk in the hope of escaping the Council’s restrictions.320 AIG contracted
by ten percent, MetLife by twenty percent, and GE Capital shrank by more than
half, to show they no longer posed systemic risk.321 But Prudential actually grew
during its time under Council oversight.322 The Council’s 2018 decision to rescind Prudential’s SIFI status was not because Prudential reduced its risk profile;
it was, instead, an implicit determination that “the Obama Administration FSOC
made a mistake in 2013.”323
As with the MetLife decision, the state commissioner’s initial dissent helped
sow the seeds for the eventual undoing of the Council’s decision. As noted above,
313
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Huff argued that the “bank run” scenario was inappropriate in the insurance setting and criticized the Council for speculating, rather than proving its conjecture
was plausible.324 The rescission decision acknowledges that it changed position
based on “[a]dditional consideration of incentives and disincentives for retail
policyholders to surrender policies, including analysis of historical evidence of
retail and institutional investor behavior,” 325 precisely what Huff had requested.
The rescission decision also discussed state regulation in far greater depth (including citing with approval changes in New Jersey law since the original decision),326 exhibiting a more nuanced understanding of the state regulatory environment Huff found lacking in the original designation.
IV. DODD-FRANK, AGENCIES, AND UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM
The insurance designation decisions reveal some important lessons about
cooperative federalism in the agency context. Cooperative federalism “envisions
a sharing of regulatory authority between the federal government and the states
that allows states to regulate within a framework delineated by federal law.”327
In this regime, states “serve not as rivals or challengers to federal authority, but
as faithful agents implementing federal programs.”328 But this dynamic does not
describe the relationship between the federal decisionmakers and their state advisors on the Financial Stability Oversight Council. The Chairman took steps to
minimize the influence that Congress granted to the state members.329 The state
members, in turn, were hostile to the Council’s decision to intervene in insurance,
and the Council dismissed their critiques rather than engage them. But the state
members still had an impact on the Council’s activities: by using their voice and
position to highlight deficiencies and knowledge gaps in the decisions, the state
insurance regulator members influenced the later decision to overturn these designations.
In that sense, the Council’s foray into insurance regulation reflects not traditional theories of cooperative federalism, but instead a unique permutation of
what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken have identified as “uncooperative federalism.”330 The authors argue that traditional conceptions of cooperative
federalism fail to capture the ways in which “states playing the role of federal
servant can also resist federal mandates” with which they disagree.331 By leveraging their positions within a cooperative federalism regime, states can use
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various forms of dissent to slow the encroachment of federal authority into traditional state spheres and thus protect areas of traditional state sovereignty.332
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken focus primarily on the state’s role in implementing federal mandates.333 Their model focuses on a theory of the servant’s power,
highlighting dependence and integration.334 Federal officials depend on state officials to carry out the policy, which gives the states discretion in choosing when
and how to do so.335 States also draw influence from integration with the federal
bureaucracy: “[r]egular interactions generate trust and give lower-level decisionmakers the knowledge and relationships they need to work the system.”336
States can use their positions as “cogs in the machine” to forestall or even dissent
from federal policies that intrude on state interests—a phenomenon that sound
familiar to many students of bureaucracy.337 And indeed, most of Bulman-Pozen
and Gerken’s examples involve states expressing various forms of dissent within
the “carrying out” function, from “licensed dissent,” such as Wisconsin and
Michigan using Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) waivers to
implement a new vision of welfare and thus shift federal dialogue toward a welfare-to-work model,338 to the civil disobedience of numerous states refusing to
carry out duties assigned to them by the Patriot Act.339
The insurance designation decisions show how Congress can achieve a similar level of protection by embedding states at the formulation stage of federal
policymaking. While the Council’s state regulators lack the power of dependency, in the sense that the Council does not rely on them to carry out its designation decision, they benefit from integration. As discussed above, participation on
the Council grants state regulators direct access to their federal counterparts, direct input into Council deliberations, and a voice (albeit a non-binding voice) in
Council decision-making.340 In a very real sense, these regulators can “use their
position in the administrative system to protect state institutional interests,” a
phenomenon that Larry Kramer described as one of the modern-day political
safeguards of federalism.341 But if the state regulators fail to convince the Council of their position, as happened in the Prudential and MetLife decisions, they
can use their position as council members to “dissent” publicly in the hope of
influencing subsequent developments. This gives them at least two bites at the
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apple: directly, when a policy is established, and indirectly, when it is reviewed
by a later court or carried out by lower-level officials.342
The benefit of dissenting from within is especially valuable given the threat
that administrative agencies pose to states. Ernest Young writes convincingly
that “[f]ederal administrative action is, in important ways, considerably more
threatening to state autonomy than legislation is.”343 The decline of judicially
enforceable federalism doctrines means that states are protected primarily by the
political safeguards of federalism: the fact that states are represented in Congress
and the sheer difficulty of getting a bill through the legislative process.344 But
neither of these is an effective check on agency preemption: states do not appoint
federal officers, and agency rulemakings and adjudications are more efficient—
and therefore more voluminous—than congressional action.345
Embedding a state regulator as a nonvoting member within the agency, as
the Dodd-Frank Act does, can help combat this threat. By participating in the
agency’s process, the state regulator can shape the record to include evidence
supporting state autonomy. Particularly in informal proceedings, agencies have
significant discretion when assembling a record for judicial review.346 If the
agency decision fails to support state interests, state regulators participating
within the agency can use dissents from agency decisions (as Commissioner
Hamm did in the MetLife case) to highlight this record evidence and to spotlight
areas in the agency’s decision that are susceptible to an arbitrary and capricious
challenge.347 In that sense, the state regulator’s dissent can serve a role similar to
that of an appellate judge’s dissent from denial of a motion to rehear a case en
banc, which can be (and increasingly is) used to flag particularly problematic
reasoning to the Supreme Court.348 The state official on the inside can use the
tools of administrative law as an administrative safeguard of federalism.349
The appointment of a state nonvoting member can also overcome uncooperative federalism’s coordination problem. Under Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s
dissent model, individual states refuse in some way to carry out their duties under
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a federal scheme.350 But as Seifter notes, “individual state officials are notoriously unreliable advocates of state power due to their more pressing short-term
incentives and a collective action problem among states.”351 The structure established by the Dodd-Frank Act, of selecting a state regulator chosen by an interest
group comprised of his or her peers, helps overcome this obstacle. The interest
group becomes a locus to collect and distill state interests, and the representative
provides a conduit for those interests to be expressed.352
CONCLUSION
The Financial Stability Oversight Council is an innovative agency designed
to meet the significant challenge of mitigating systemic risk in an increasingly
complex American financial ecosystem. Congress matched this structure with an
equally innovative method for the states to participate in deliberations. The resulting hybrid model was designed to allow the Council to benefit from the
states’ extensive regulatory experience and to tap into local knowledge about
trends in the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, while deliberating and
deciding issues from an appropriately national scope.
The Council’s insurance designation decisions were a baptism by fire for
this new form of cooperative federalism. While the experiment did not function
as intended and exposed a rift between Congress and the executive branch on the
value of state involvement, it also unintentionally revealed a new vector for state
dissent within a federal scheme. The state regulators used their position inside
the Council to highlight deficiencies in federal policy, which ultimately helped
courts and the Council itself to reconsider what the states saw as a flawed federal
encroachment into insurance. The vignette thus fits comfortably into the emerging scholarship regarding uncooperative federalism and reveals how states can
harness new administrative safeguards of federalism. If, as David Shapiro has
suggested, federalism is a “dialogue” between the federal government and the
states about national policy,353 the Dodd-Frank Act shows us a creative new way
to amplify the states’ voice.
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